Cursor traces malicious Claude Code downloads to a leaked vendor key
A November 13 investigation update links October’s tampered extension downloads to credentials exposed through Fireworks and a compromised distribution cache.
Cursor’s November 13 investigation update connects its October malicious-extension incident to an exposed key issued to Fireworks. Access to historical records yielded more credentials, enabling movement into internal tools and eventually the extension distribution cache. The important detail is where the substitution happened: a clean upstream package does not protect a downloader if a later distribution point has been altered. Think of genuine goods being replaced inside the warehouse serving the shop.
Fireworks had separately expanded its own incident disclosure on November 9. It reported impacts to secrets, datasets and unfinished models for some accounts, alongside account and billing information. The company brought in Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 for forensic help. Its bulletin also described an October 24 intrusion into development machines following an incident at a third-party cloud provider. Fireworks said it had tightened credentials and network access and disabled some self-service dataset transfers while investigating.
The affected Claude Code extension versions were 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Windows and macOS. Cursor’s original notice placed their availability between 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. US Pacific time on October 29, roughly eleven hours. Its new account says at most 5,000 users potentially received the cached packages. Potential receipt is different from confirmed remote control of every machine. Cursor says it rebuilt the extension marketplace and helped take the attacker’s server offline.
Microsoft’s analysis explains why removing an extension can be insufficient. The injected code ran as the extension loaded and tried to plant an SSH key and startup mechanisms. SSH is a tool for accessing another computer remotely. Permissions and configuration could prevent the attempted connection from working, while files created outside the extension directory remained. Microsoft also confirmed that these packages were not distributed through Microsoft’s Visual Studio Marketplace or the official Claude Code npm channel. Anthropic did not create the malicious builds.
The practical starting point is installation history, not assuming that every Claude Code installation is compromised. Cursor’s original notice supplies checks and remediation guidance for the affected versions and window. Microsoft recommends preserving evidence before removing confirmed malicious artifacts, then investigating activity and replacing exposed credentials from a trusted device. For software users, the broader lesson is concrete: a familiar product name does not authenticate every copy delivered along its distribution route.
Investigation update dates: Cursor, November 13, 2026; Fireworks, November 9, 2026. The sources give dates only. The malicious-extension incident occurred on October 29, 2026. Original distribution window: Oct 29, 2026, 17:27 to Oct 30, 04:35 Beijing time / Oct 29, 2026, 5:27 AM to 4:35 PM EDT.
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